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One of the reasons why there is no Hegelian school in contemporary ethics in the
way that there are Kantian, Humean and Aristotelian schools is because
Hegelians have been unable to clearly articulate the Hegelian alternative to those
schools’ moral psychologies, i.e., to present a Hegelian model of the motivation
to, perception of, and responsibility for moral action. Here it is argued that in its
most basic terms Hegel’s model can be understood as follows: the agent acts in a
responsible and thus paradigmatic sense when she identiﬁes as reasons those
motivations which are grounded in his or her talents and support actions that are
likely to develop those talents in ways suggested by his or her interests.
At the beginning of his recent book, Hegel’s Conscience, Dean Moyar considers the
reasons why there is no Hegelian school in contemporary ethics in the way that
there are Kantian, Humean and Aristotelian schools:
The ﬁnal, and in my view decisive reason for the absence of
Hegelian ethics is the lack of an accessible account of Hegel’s
conception of practical reason. Aristotelians can invoke the
virtuous person who possesses practical wisdom and who is able
to appropriately ‘perceive’ particular situations; Humeans have a
clear and commonsensical belief-desire model; Kantians have a
decision procedure in the Categorical Imperative and an attendant
moral psychology of respect for the law; and utilitarians have the
intuitive goal of maximizing the good consequences of one’s
action. Hegel does not give us anything so clear-cut at the level of
individual reasoning, and without an intuitive account of what the
Hegelian agent does, it is hard to see how Hegel’s ethics can secure
a place to compete against the other theories (Moyar 2011: 8).
I think that Moyar is fundamentally right in this assessment, and the aim of this essay
is to redress the deﬁciency at the level of moral psychology, particularly in comparison
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with Humean and Kantian approaches. By ‘moral psychology’ I mean broadly
a model of the motivation to, perception of, and responsibility for moral action.
Within the terms of this project, Hegel’s basic model can be articulated as follows: the
agent acts in a responsible and thus paradigmatic sense when she identiﬁes as reasons
those motivations which are grounded in his or her talents and support actions that
are likely to develop those talents in ways suggested by his or her interests.
While I believe that my proposal is broadly compatible with many
contemporary but more abstract interpretations of Hegel’s account of practical
reason and with some prominent views in contemporary moral psychology,
demonstrating neither is my primary purpose here. Instead, I want to ﬂesh out
Hegel’s account as one of contemporary appeal and intuitive accuracy. Because
for Hegel, the distinctive moral value developed within this moral psychology is
the expression of free individuality, we can orient that appeal by beginning with
Hegel’s summary of his critical appraisal of Kant’s ethics in his lectures on the
history of philosophy: ‘What merits the name of truth in the Kantian philosophy,
is that thinking is grasped as concrete in itself, self-determining itself [sich selbst
bestimmend]; thus freedom is recognized’ (VGP 331).1 But: ‘[the Kantian
philosophy] does not know how to become master of the individuality of self-
consciousness; [it] describes reason very well, but does this in a thoughtless,
empirical way by which it again robs itself of its truth’ (VGP 332-3). Hegel
suggests, then, that Kant’s groundbreaking discovery of autonomous practical
reason is still shrouded in vestiges of an empiricist account of individual awareness
of and motivation by moral features of action. What a Hegelian moral psychology
needs to do, then, is to provide a non-empiricist account of the individuality of self-
determination, i.e., a non-empiricist account of internal motivation.
I
In Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, the best place to look for such an account is in
the section somewhat oddly entitled ‘the Spiritual Animal Kingdom’. That
section follows directly from the section on Active Reason in which Hegel
engages with speciﬁcally empiricist moral psychologies (in Pleasure and Necessity
and the Law of the Heart) and with the Kantian doctrine of virtue (in Virtue and
the Way of the World). There, Hegel found fault with these moral psychologies
precisely for their inability to specify motivations with which the individual can
identify as reasons. This difﬁculty is conceptualized as the problem that if I do
not have an account of myself as the source of my action, then I cannot know
myself as an individual by acting. Since Kant’s Doctrine of Virtue is the point in
his philosophy at which he goes the furthest in attempting to explain the
individuality of practical reason, the criticism of Kant in this part of the
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Phenomenology can be considered a detailed elaboration of the complaint registered
in summary form in the lectures on the history of philosophy quoted in the
previous paragraph. And since the main stumbling point for both Fichte’s and
Kant’s theories of virtue is the duty of self-development, i.e., the duty to self to
develop our own talents, it is not surprising that this moral psychology is
explicitly focused on the relation between talents and interests.
In PS z401/PG 296-8, Hegel introduces talents as a way of articulating the
experience of action for an individual who ﬁnds her social and natural
environment to be supportive of her individual agency (i.e., who ﬁnds their agency to
be already a part of the universal structure of the world around them).2 Talents are
part of the agent’s ‘original determinate nature’: they precede action in some sense,
and they are distinct from the characters of other agents. But talents are more than
just dispositions or capacities to be triggered by external stimuli. The agent with
talents does not stand opposed to the world of public objects around them, but
somehow constitutes that world. Talents, then, are the circumstances of action when
understood as internal to the individual in some way: ‘a set of given circumstances
which are in themselves the individual’s own original naturey’ Circumstances as
viewed through the lens of talents are the inner means by which we translate our
ends into reality. But because of this close connection between given context and
talent, proximally talent appears to the agent as something given rather than chosen.
Because talents are ways of appropriating and using physical objects (including
our own bodies), talents are a way in which we locate agents in the circumstances of
actions. In this respect they play a similar role to belief in contemporary causal
accounts of action. The belief connects my desire for some end to the circumstances
by conceiving of the circumstances as a means to that end. Talents do the same by
specifying kinds of activities by which the agent is effective at turning circumstances
into resources for action. For this very reason, what counts as a talent is determined
in part by the relevant circumstances. Only because of the relative solidity of the
ground under us and the strength of gravity are running and jumping talents for
human beings, since they are ways of making secure footholds and gravity’s
resistance into means for our ends of getting to certain places. Merpeople cannot
have the talents of running and jumping in their undersea environment.
The exercise of talents becomes an explicit form of individuality when
talents are appropriated by interests, i.e., when the agent self-reﬂectively chooses
those talents (and thus the circumstances of her action) as her own. Then we get
the real process of action, in which our interest in an action identiﬁes aspects of
the circumstances that are rendered signiﬁcant by the talents we possess: ‘But the
actual means and the real transition are the unity of talent with the nature of the
matter in hand, present in that interest.’ The process of action is one of unifying
the ends and the means through the coordination of talents and interests to
produce an action or work.
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Interests are another way of locating the agent in their circumstances. Our
interests are those things about which we feel either concern or curiosity. For our
purposes, the crucial feature of both concern and curiosity is the way that they
draw us out of ourselves into identiﬁcation with something or someone other
than us. Compassion is a kind of concern for another’s well-being, and curiosity
is a sense that information to be learned from something as yet unknown matters
to me in some sense, even if I cannot make clear what that sense is. Concern and
curiosity are ways in which the circumstances of the world come to take on the
shape of the self for us, i.e., ways in which we feel ourselves in the world. A world
for which we had no concerns and about which we were not curious would not
be our world at all; it would not be our home. As Terry Pinkard has pointed out,
on Hegel’s conception we must ﬁrst determine who we are by sifting through the
world of our autobiography and separating those parts of worldly events that are
accurate expressions of our character from those that are inaccurate, and the
notion of interest is Hegel’s theoretical means for judging which is which
(Pinkard 1996: 116).
If talents represent the way in which the world makes us its own denizens,
interests represent the way in which we make the world our own world. Interests
play a role somewhat similar to desire in contemporary causal accounts, in the sense
that they represent the directedness of the agent. After all, a picture of agency is
supposed to be a picture of self-determination, of the sense in which the agent
originates their action. Interests express the agent’s self-directedness towards the
world, and thus the sense in which they are agents rather than patients.
But I have so far left out the most distinctive element of Hegel’s account:
the heart of the matter, which is present in the interest, or what Hegel calls the
Sache selbst. It is not enough, in Hegel’s view, that I identify with one of my talents
and seek to exercise it in the proper circumstances. The interest must further
invoke a deep sense of signiﬁcance that connects it with others involved in similar
projects. That is, we must be animated in the use of our talents by a universal
sense of importance that in principle exceeds any work that we might produce as
a result of our actions.
In order to see why this element is necessary for us to have action in the
true sense of the term, it is important to step back a bit and remember that the
investigation of the Phenomenology is the attempt to ﬁnd an adequate object and
mode of knowledge, and Hegel quickly argues that such knowledge can only be
self-knowledge. So the spiritual animal is being auditioned for the role of
adequate self-knower, and the ‘heart of the matter’ is introduced as a way of
solving a certain problem with the view. On the basic view, you begin with an
initially loose connection between the inner means (talents and circumstances) of
your action and your potential ends (as determined by your interests). Then the
interest-guided exercise of talents brings the two together in an actual means that
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just is the expression of the end in the production of some kind of work. But as
anyone who has ever re-read their own writing will testify, the sense of the unity
of the elements that is present in the actual process of writing is soon lost in
reﬂection on the work (PS z404/PG 300-1). As a mere existing thing, then, the
work cannot provide us with a basis for adequate knowledge of ourselves as the
integrated system of talents and interests. But the ongoing project of reﬂecting
on our work and trying to make it better - i.e., trying to develop means adequate
to our ends—can provide the basis for such self-knowledge (PS z407/PG 302-3).
So once the view is made dynamic and interpretive, it requires this sense of
signiﬁcance and purpose exceeding all individual products. This is therefore
action that takes the form of holding particular and contingent elements together
in a universal sense of the project (PS z408/PG 303-4).
As an example, the heart of the matter for a particular musician is probably
best understood as a particular movement or tradition of music. The pianist must
be motivated by a sense of what music can accomplish and what counts as good
music, a sense that exceeds any particular piece of music and which provides her
the standpoint to integrate, e.g., one of her compositions or performances into
her longer-term project of self-hood by ﬁnding even the disintegrated features of
the composition or performance to provide evidence of her access to an integrated
sense of music that remains to be produced. But this sense of the fundamental
signiﬁcance of music extends beyond the modiﬁcation of products or performances
to include the modiﬁcation of the individual herself: she may need to develop her
talents in different directions to properly express herself, and her interests may shift
with exposure to different musical movements. But because individual musical
projects are the only expression and reality of musical movements, her interest-
guided use of talents changes the heart of the matter as well.3
II
As part of the broadly naturalistic bias of the contemporary philosophy of action,
issues of explanation loom large. Though there is a tendency in the Hegel
literature to dismiss these concerns, I think they are real enough so long as
‘explanation’ is not understood in a merely narrowly, efﬁciently causal way.4
Backing away from the text of the Phenomenology for a moment, one of the ways to
see the appeal of Hegel’s model is to see the way that it provides non-empiricist
explanations of actions and therefore counts as a rational reconstruction of our
everyday practice of understanding agency. In terms of providing explanatory
resources for actions, the model suggests four basic kinds of explananda,
i.e., four different kinds of things that might ﬁll the gap in our understanding
which motivates a request for an explanation.5 To begin with, we might actually
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cite some aspect of the physical circumstances as explanation. The most basic
form of such an explanation is certainly George Mallory’s explanation for why he
climbed Mt. Everest: because it is there. In the same vein, a surfer might explain
why he surfed early in the morning (an apparent incongruity given the
personalities of most surfers) by appeal to the fact that the winds are gentler in
the morning and thus the waves have a better shape.
A second common kind of explanation is in terms of talent: if we are
watching an American football game and you ask me why the fullback carried the
ball up the middle, even though there was room to the outside of the line and the
holes in the middle were all full with defensive players, I might respond that that kind
of running is what he is good at. Sometimes, talent explains its own exercise. In part
this is because any successful exercise of a talent is satisfying; in part this is just
because people get into habits determined by their talents that are hard to break. We
even have a colloquial expression warning of the danger of seeing the world in terms
of your own talents: if all you have is a hammer, everything looks like a nail.
We sometimes also explain actions in terms of the presence of common
projects. If one asks why the skinny, artistically minded kid from Texas ended up
playing American football, the answer might just be something like ‘that’s what
they do there.’ Because common projects are the source and context of our
interests, and play such an important role in deﬁning our talents, sometimes they
can swamp those interests and talents. In that case the incongruity between, e.g.,
our talents and our actions may generate a request for explanation of the action
(‘Why did he play football?’), and this request may be answered by appeal to the
social projects in which we have been swept up.
The most unlikely candidate for explanans of an action is our interest. On
the one hand, this is puzzling, since the interest ties the agent most closely to the
action. But this is what accounts for its generally poor suitability as an
explanation: what we want explained is some kind of action, and this seems to
presuppose that there was an interest. Thus, appeals to interest share the feature
of appeals to desire: they appeal to that which is normally presupposed in
conceiving of the explanandum as an action at all. But when explanations by
appeal to interests are appropriate, they are deeper and more informative than
explanations by reference to desire. Appeals to interest implicate the agent’s
own sense of self, often drawing in a historical element. Thus, the explanation for
why one might write a dissertation on Hegel would in all likelihood cite an
unexpected interest in Hegel that speciﬁed the aspects of Hegel’s philosophy that
resonated with the author, combined with the kind of historical story that
explains how the author came to see herself in Hegel’s philosophy. This kind of
explanation reﬂects a deeper rift in the understanding of the person requesting
the explanation, and thus requires a longer story about who the agent is in terms
of how she has come to see herself in the world.
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Thus the alternative model suggests as explananda the kinds of things that
we naturally say in response to requests for explanation. It is certainly still
schematic, but it nonetheless points to the cares and concerns embedded in our
everyday appreciation and evaluation of actions.
III
Corresponding to these four kinds of explanations are four kinds of failures of
agency that result from the improper or inadequate participation in the action by
each element. When we try to do something for which we have no talent, we
frequently embarrass ourselves. At issue is more than simply failing to achieve a
goal; even if we do (by luck) achieve the goal, we fail to express who we are in
that action. Agency is a kind of effectiveness of the agent, and in such cases the
circumstances were effective, not the agent. We will not have the proper basis to
pick out the agent as a locus of activity and bearer of responsibility. Consider an
example in which I am trying to throw a rock into a pond, and my lack of
coordination causes me to miss so badly that the rock hits my friend, who
subsequently throws the rock into the pond in disgust. Though there is some
sense in which I have accomplished my goal (the rock did end up in the pond,
after all), there is another sense in which I didn’t accomplish anything. I am not
the relevant agent with respect to the rock and the pond; my friend is.
When an agent acts in the absence of appropriate external means in the
physical circumstances, she fails to connect with the world. At the outer limits of
this case, we will not be able to make sense of the agent as sharing the same
world of public objects as we do. Again, this is more than just a question of
achieving ends or satisfying desires. Agency is a kind of effectiveness in the world;
it is distinguished from fantasy or internal role-playing. When I cannot throw the
rock into the pond because I do not see that it is only a part of a much larger
boulder, my failure to understand the world has an effect similar to my failure to
understand myself in the earlier example. Again, this is true even if a subsequent
earthquake knocks the boulder into the bond. The issue is not one of failing to
achieve goals, but one of failing to achieve the contemplated interaction with the
environment at all. Though these are not the kind of failures of agency that have
drawn the attention of philosophers of action, they are common experiences in
our lives. What we learn from them is not that we must better calculate means to
ends; what we learn is that we are not the people we thought we were, and that
the world is not what we thought it was. What we learn is not how to better
satisfy our desires, but rather how better to understand our existential situation.
A third distinct kind of failure of agency is action in the absence of socially
valued projects. In an important sense, this is a more signiﬁcant failure than the
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two already discussed, since it reﬂects a failure of the agent to see herself as
human in the way that this is humanity is reﬂected by those around the agent.
Our sense of what counts as human is shaped by our sense of the range of
signiﬁcant human projects that are shared in our social environment. When we
act as driven by our own personal interests in the absence of such a supportive
sense of social signiﬁcance, we risk the integrity of our own agency because we
act in the absence of a social medium that allows us to recognize ourselves as
human agents in the actions we perform. It may therefore not be the fault of the
individual agent that they are unable to act in the richest sense of that term.
Society may prevent human beings from being agents and thus persons. One
paradigm example of this is the predicament of lesbians and gay men in societies
that do not acknowledge same-sex relationships as forms of love. In those
situations, the lesbian or gay man may be forced into the tragic choice between
their own sense of self and obtaining recognition of their humanity. The
argument of Hegel’s political philosophy is essentially driven by the view that a
society that cannot provide such a social medium for self-recognition is unjust.
This alternative model provides an articulation of agency that helps to connect
the value of agency with the respect accorded to persons by social recognition
(in the form of rights, opportunities, rewards, etc.).
We may also fail to act in the richest sense of the term when the action is
either not motivated by our interest at all, or our interests are somehow not fully
engaged in the action. Whereas in action with lack of talent the reality of our
constitution is shown not to correspond to the vision that we have of it, here
whatever vision we have is swamped by talent, circumstances, or general projects
and is thereby rendered ineffective. In Bertolluci’s The Conformist, Marcello lacks
the courage to assert his own interests against fascist and traditional social
standards; his visibility as an individual is a source of anxiety for him, and he
seeks to eliminate that visibility through marriage and through work with the
fascist secret police. In the end, the action he has begun to assassinate his former
teacher must be carried out by others. Or our best intentions may be trumped by
a combination of talents and circumstances. If I watch television or read the
newspaper instead of working on this paper, it will not be because of my greater
interest in what is on TV or in the paper. Instead, there is a pleasant inertia to be
felt in not being an agent for a while, in letting my talent for reading or
comprehending cinematic presentations exercise itself effortlessly on whatever
subjects are presented to me. Tolstoy captures this phenomenon brilliantly:
Oblonsky subscribed to and read a Liberal paper—not an
extreme Liberal paper but one that expressed the opinions of
the majority. And although neither science, art, nor politics
specially interested him, he ﬁrmly held to the opinions of the
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majority and of his paper on those subjects, changing his views
when the majority changed theirs,—or rather, not changing
them—they changed imperceptibly of their own accord. Thus
Liberalism became habitual to Oblonsky, and he loved his
paper as he loved his after-dinner cigar, for the slight mistiness
it produced in his brain (Tolstoy 1995: 7-8).
When I write this paper, my sense of self is at stake because of my interest in the
subject. But when I read the newspaper nothing is at stake. I am inclined to
subsume the classic cases of weakness of will under this model. The key to
understanding them is not a conﬂict of desires, but the comfort in acting without
putting our conception of self on the line. It is a perverse form of agency that
utilizes the tools of agency to avoid the risks of agency. In one of the classic
novels of drug experiences, Hunter S. Thompson begins Fear and Loathing in Las
Vegas with the epigraph from Samuel Johnson: ‘‘He who makes a beast of himself
gets rid of the pain of being a man.’’ Though certainly not all intoxication is the
result of weakness of will, I suspect that this self-forgetfulness or non-agency is at
the heart of the phenomenon.
IV
At this point, we can return to a more textual grounding by exploring the
sense in which such a picture is non-‘empiricist’ in Hegel’s distinctive sense
of that term in his polemic against Kant’s moral psychology. Here we can
differentiate ﬁve different ways in which Hegel’s schema might be considered
non-empiricist:
(1) the model describes aspects of a distinctive kind of activity, not kinds
of dispositions;
(2) similarly, talents and interests are long-running features, not discrete
causal antecedents;
(3) talents and interests are objective in an ordinary, public or social
sense, rather than inner mental states;
(4) there is an internal relation between talent and interest as opposed to
the external relation between empiricist mental states such as beliefs
and desires;
(5) similarly, beliefs and desires are something like properties or states of
the agent, but talents and interests constitute the agent.
It may help to get a better grasp of the way in which these features characterize a
‘non-empiricist’ view by contrasting them with aspects of contemporary
(Humean) empiricist causal accounts of action (i.e., belief-desire accounts).
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(1) Activity vs. triggered dispositions. As a point about the will as such, this is one
that Hegel makes explicit also in the Philosophy of Right: the will ‘is not just a
possibility, predisposition, or capacity (potentia), but the inﬁnite in actuality (inﬁnitum
actu)’ (PRy22). But Hegel is explicit about this in the Phenomenology as well,
claiming that agency cannot be conceived as a potential that is made actual
through human efforts, but rather as something very real in the world that is
simply expressed through action (PS z391/PG 290).6 As Allen Wood has noted,
this idea is closely connected with the notion that freedom is a good, since it
makes sense to think of the good as something actual rather than something
merely potential (1990: 40).
The sticking point here might seem to be talent, since the most natural way
to think about human talents is as a kind of capacity, but it makes all the
difference whether one thinks of them as dispositions to be triggered by external
events or as activities of the agent. Take the example of a gymnast’s talent.
In describing a gymnast as talented, we might be taken to refer to physical
capacities that are then triggered in the right circumstances, such as balance or
leaping ability. But these are not really what we mean in describing an athlete’s
talent. One of swimmer Michael Phelps’s important features is that he is able to
quickly metabolize the lactate produced by his muscles while swimming, which
allows him to train more vigorously and to compete in more events. But it seems
odd to describe this as part of his talent; it sounds better to say that it is an ability
of his body, not of him. It is a kind of mere physical circumstance of his action
rather than being a part of his talent.
In describing a gymnast as talented, we might better refer to her ability to
translate a coach’s directions into bodily awareness and to translate bodily
awareness into movement. But each of these abilities is better understood as
something that she does as opposed to dispositions that are triggered. Doing
certain things (e.g., training) count as developing the talent because they make
possible certain further forms of the same kind of activity (e.g., new routines).
This is crucial to Hegel because it is a resource for reconceiving the self-mastery
of free agents in a way that does not rely on the distinction between free choice
and habits on which Kant insists. Neither talent nor interest is like a habit or a
desire that remains dormant until triggered by the right circumstances and thus
constitutes a kind of external determination of the will; rather it is an activity of
the will that seeks out and constitutes circumstances appropriate for its exercise
and development. And in claiming that talents are the self-actualizing good,
Hegel shows himself at odds with any view according to which a separate mental
state (belief) is required to coordinate the striving of the will (desire) with speciﬁc
circumstances (PS z386; PG 286-8).
(2) Long-running features vs. discrete causal antecedents. Kant claims that all ends
set prior to moral maxims are empirical grounds and self-seeking, but ends that
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result from maxims adopted as required by the concept of duty can be
distinctively moral.7 Hegel rejects this conception on the grounds that the same
role is played by the speciﬁc interests of the agent in both cases: a universal is
given life, a concrete form, by the way in which the agent takes an interest in a
particular situation (PS z385/PG 286). The prior/posterior distinction, whether
regarded as an issue of the causal history of the action or of the constructed
justiﬁcation for it, is for Hegel an essentially superﬁcial distinction that cannot
generate the deep moral difference between the two kinds of ends as required by
Kant’s theory of virtue. Put more positively, Hegel’s model conceives of agency
less in terms of motivation than in terms of characteristic processes. Rather than
identifying the phenomenon of agency by referring to mental events (beliefs and
desires) that cause other mental events (intentions), this model refers to the shape
of the activity that includes the action as a proper part. Whereas beliefs and
desires are necessarily antecedent events that may or may not extend beyond the
temporal threshold of their production of the intention or action, talents and
interests are necessarily long-running elements that persist throughout the
timeframe of action and in fact extend beyond it in the ordinary case.8
(3) Public features vs. inner mental states. It is perhaps easiest to see here Hegel’s
difference from any empiricist view. This difference becomes most apparent in
Hegel’s inclusion of the Sache selbst or heart of the matter in his basic schema for
action, but let us put that aside for the moment in order to see how even those
other elements of Hegel’s schema appear to be quite different from their
empiricist counterparts. Talents needn’t be thought of as distinctively internal to
the individual; because they are things that the individual does in the world they
are publicly available in a way that beliefs and desires are not. Talents therefore tie
agency to the distinctive constitution of each agent in a way that does not invoke
the distinction between inner mental states and outer physical activity. Though
different agents have different talents, whether they have that talent is an
objective question to be determined by the interpretation of action; the agent
herself has no privileged ﬁrst-person access to this element. This public aspect of
talents and interests is precisely what generates the problems of hypocrisy and
deception later in the section on the spiritual animal kingdom (PS z415/PG 307-8).
As with talents, interests are an objective fact about the agent, rather than an
internal mental state to be introspected. If I claim to have an interest in playing
the piano, but I never practice nor do I listen to recorded piano music, you would
be within your rights to reply that I do not really have an interest in piano. I am
either self-deceived or I am lying. My interests are determined by interpretation
of what I do, and this is a public matter. Furthermore, interests also have a
reciprocal relationship to the physical circumstances of actions. Certain interests
are likely to develop only in certain circumstances (e.g., the interest in surﬁng in
places where the waves are good). More subtly, talents are going to play a role in
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specifying what count as the physical circumstances of the action: of all the inﬁnite
number of facts about the agent’s environment at the time of action, talents help to
pick out which are relevant as causal conditions for the activity of the agent.
But Hegel claims that this coordination of talents and circumstances
remains inward in some contrastive sense: a mere inner as opposed to an actual
means (PS z401; PG 297). Though it is clear how talents and context together
form a means for bringing about ends, it is less than clear what it means to say
that they are distinctively ‘inner.’ It is particularly puzzling because talents and
circumstances at ﬁrst appear to be the elements in Hegel’s schema that have a
primarily objective source (i.e., they are the two elements that most appear to the
agent to be given prior to the activity of subjectivity). One expects the inner to be
identiﬁed with the subjective or distinctively mental, but here Hegel makes
the reverse identiﬁcation. By contrast, the actual means to the end invokes the
elements of the schema that have a fundamentally subjective source (i.e., those
which appear to be characterized by mental activity): the interest and the Sache
selbst. Hegel has completely reversed the usual empirical understanding of inner
and outer in action. What sense can be given to this reversal?
Fundamentally, the reversal derives from the point we saw above in (1),
namely that agency is an actuality rather than a capacity. At the same time, action
is always a form of negativity and therefore of change (PS z399/PG 295). In the
context of the Phenomenology, after exhausting all of the historically available
understandings of the change enacted by action in terms of realizing some
potential, and before turning to a discussion of the social institutions (spirit) that
will give concrete goals pursued by individuals, Hegel must specify a new form of
action-induced change from one state of existence into another state of existence.
The distinction between the inner and the actual is maintained, but now must be
given a new interpretation. On this interpretation, the inner is that which remains
open to alternate possible futures. Thus Hegel claims that talents represent ‘‘a
simple principle, a transparent universal elementy’’ (PS z398; PG 294-5). This
is an element that provides the possibility of different realizations of the agent’s
character in action. Hegel’s view is that the truth underlying Kant’s apparent
confusion about the proper constraint on the development of talents is that
talents play the role of a kind of natural universal that is self-specifying, i.e., a telic
universal that includes differential possible routes of development or realization.
Once Fichte has deepened and radicalized Kant’s own insight into the role of
effectiveness in distinguishing between true willing and mere wishing, the inner/
outer distinction is fundamentally changed by the recognition that what ends one
can set depends, in part, on what one can actually do.9 This is why Hegelian
talents are individuated forms of the capacity to set ends, in the Kantian sense.
On Hegel’s view, it is the interest the agent takes in her action that answers
the questions, ‘whether or what is to be done here.’ That is, the interest provides
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the resolution to the open future presented by the complex of talents and
circumstances, and thus when we exercise our talents while guided by our
interests, our action is an actual means for translating ends into existence. But the
open future is represented neither by a mere potential nor by an indeterminate state
of being or character; rather it is represented by a completely determinate original
nature and the circumstances connected with it. This is what Hegel means in
describing the original nature as a ‘determinate range’ that is then given a speciﬁc
form of life by its animating principle (PS z398/PG 216). Talents are inner in the
sense that their signiﬁcance is only made clear by the animating force of interest.
Let us cut through this abstraction with an example: the action of practicing
the piano. Though talents and circumstances lay dormant until the interest arises
to begin the practice session, this is not because they are mere potentials. The
piano sits there, as real and physically imposing as anything. The pianist’s talents
remain in her as well in the form of conceptual connections and physical traits
(e.g., real neural pathways that are not merely present as dispositions or
potentials, but have an actual physical and effective presence). But at the same
time, the musical talent and physical presence of the piano and sheet music lay
open a future that can be determined in different ways: different pieces can be
practiced, in different ways, etc. But another crucial element is the way in which
the talents and the physical objects themselves are transformed. Every note
played changes the piano in some way, and what and how the pianist practices
will shape her skill in a certain way. So there is a mutual interaction of interest,
talent, and physical object that partially constitutes the agency of the pianist.10
But this necessary mutual interaction pushes decisively beyond Kant’s insistence
on internal as opposed to external grounds of the will.
(4) Internal vs. external relations. Talents and interests are internally related in a
way that distinguishes them quite sharply from beliefs and desires as elements in
a basic model.11 But this also distinguishes their relation sharply from the relation
between natural inclinations and rational respect from the moral law in the
Kantian view. Whereas neither beliefs and desires, nor inclinations and rational
maxims are intrinsically related to one another, talents and interests have a
naturally dialectical relationship in which they each shape the other. Talents
naturally suggest interests, as we tend to see ourselves in what we do best; and
interests are pursued through activities that develop talents and make them both
richer and more determinate.12 The two are engaged in a mutual granting of
signiﬁcance or speciﬁcation of what counts as talent or circumstance. But talents
are inherently oriented towards goals (one can waste a talent, but not a capacity),
and so to conceive of circumstances as the location for the exercise of talents is
to give those circumstances the form of the self by determining their signiﬁcance
by reference to the goal-orientation of an agent, and an interest then makes this
explicit.13 A musician might have an initial talent for remembering musical ideas
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and correlating sounds to their notation on the page. This talent might generate
an interest in playing music under the right circumstances. This interest then
develops the talent through practice that not only increases the talent (e.g., more
complex musical ideas can be remembered and more complex notation
processed while sight-reading), but also orients it towards speciﬁc kinds of
performances (e.g., improvisation or interpretation of scores). This internal
relation comes to Hegel out of meditation on the role in Kant and Fichte of
effectiveness in mediating between talents on the one hand and setting ends on
the other. The fact that effectiveness is shot through the whole process of agency
means that there is no point in tracing any speciﬁc, prioritized pathway of causal
determination from one to another, which is the stumbling block for all empiricist
causal theories of agency (i.e., the problem of wayward causal chains).14 Instead,
there is an inherently recursive process of mutual talent and interest formation and
development. This is part of what Hegel was insisting on when he claimed that
talents and interests together are both the material and the purpose of activity, and the
element that absorbs the shape of individuality (PS z396/PG 293 and PS z401/PG
296-8). Unlike laws that are applied or instantiated, talents and interests are modiﬁed
in the process of their exercise and pursuit.
5. Constituting character vs. states as properties. By ‘states as properties’ I do not
mean to name some speciﬁc metaphysical claim, but rather a speciﬁc practical
problem for empiricist theories of agency regarding the distance between speciﬁc
motivations and the self, a problem that often goes by the name ‘weakness of
will.’ The problem has been nicely generalized as a problem for causal theories by
David Velleman, who argues that such theories do not require any substantial
role for the agent in her own action, since the agent can in principle distance
herself from any of her desires or intentions. In cases of weakness of will, for
example, I seem to be moved to action by desires that are, in some sense, external
to me. Therefore, the common model of action is a model of those of our actions
in which we do not play a central role—but surely these are derivative, borderline
cases of action rather than the paradigmatic cases. Adding a hierarchical element
does not appear to help, since I can disassociate myself from my second-order
desires just as readily as from my ﬁrst-order desires.
Thus Velleman has some sympathy with Roderick Chisholm’s claim that
such a model is not really a model of agency at all. But rather than endorse
Chisholm’s appeal to the agent as a kind of primitive notion on par with desire or
intention, Velleman claims that the agent intervenes between her desires and
beliefs and her intentions in the form of a motivation to act for reasons. The ‘I’ in
action is to be found in the ‘desire to act in accordance with reasons, a desire that
produces behavior, in your name, by adding its motivational force to that of
whichever motives appear to provide the strongest reasons for acting, just as you
are said to throw your weight behind them’ (Velleman 2000: 141). To put this
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from the agent’s perspective, she can recognize herself in her action when she
notices the role played by this motivation to act for reasons.
The problem with Velleman’s (broadly Kantian) emended view is that it
appears to lose the agent in a different way. If the agent is to be identiﬁed with
the abstract motivation to act for reasons, then the agent is to be identiﬁed with a
motivation that all agents necessarily have in common rather than with some
aspect of their agency that distinguishes one agent from another. So if the desire-
belief model loses its grip on the agent because it does not include any element
from which the agent cannot disassociate herself, Velleman’s model loses the
agent because it appeals to an element from which no agent can disassociate
themselves and thus which cannot pick them out as an individual agent.15 This is
also why contemporary, broadly Kantian accounts of Hegel’s theory of practical
reason in terms of acting on a reason as opposed to acting on a given motivation
are, by themselves, insufﬁcient to respond to the challenge of articulating free
individuality that Hegel has set himself by his critique of Kant.
Hegel’s response to precisely such difﬁculties in Kant and Fichte is an
expressivist moral psychology in which the agent identiﬁes as reasons those
motivations which are grounded in his or her talents and support actions that are
likely to develop those talents in ways suggested by his or her interests. By
‘expressivist,’ I mean to describe Hegel’s claim that the true ends of action have
to have as their content the very character or personality of the agent herself.
Hegel motivates this expressivism by contrasting it with the mistake of thinking
that an agent’s ends could somehow be distinct from his or her character (i.e., of
an agent ‘wanting to give reality to a different content’ than their character). In
such a case, the acting agent would be ‘a nothing working towards nothing’
(PSz401/PG296). This is Hegel’s way of articulating the basic worry that
Velleman formulates as the concern that I lose the agent in the story of action.16
Hegel’s more radical formulation expresses, in quite graphic terms, the
disappearance of the agent in action—but from the ﬁrst-person perspective as
well as from the third-person perspective. Hegel is concerned with mistaken self-
understandings of action in addition to theoretical mistakes in the philosophy of
action. Or rather, Hegel is concerned with such theoretical mistakes as the
mistakes of self-reﬂective agents in action as much as the mistakes of theorists of
action.17 The mistakes of such agents can lead to their actual disappearance to
themselves in their lives, and not just the theoretical elision of the agent in our
philosophical theories. It is precisely this concern with self-knowledge that
animates Hegel’s account, and why he generalizes Kant’s recognition that
individual interest is necessary to specify our deepest moral duties of virtue into
the claim that ‘all the things which engage individuality are ends in themselves, and the use of
powers, along with playing the game of giving them outward expression is what gives life to
what otherwise would be the dead in-itself ’ (PS z393/PG 291).
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The schema of talents and interests addresses the interface between self
and context that is contained in Hegel’s fundamental formulation of freedom:
being at home with oneself in the other.18 More than anyone else in the tradition,
Hegel tries to work out in detail the way in which individual agency is compatible
with the deep ties and inﬂuences that come with being a social and embodied
subject.19 The schema isolates as basic elements of agency those features that
describe the self/context interface in both passive and active terms. Put another
way, it is a description of the integration of internal (individual) and external
(social) points of view from the internal point of view: it is what spirit looks like
from the inside out.20 As a result it gives the phenomenological form of
awareness of spirit, which is in part the way in which the social substance is
animated by the individual. Thus this schema helps to combat the false
impression that Hegel’s spirit is social substance from the top down, particularly
in the Phenomenology.
V
A further way to see the value of the notions of talent and interest is to locate
them in Hegel’s own schematic presentation of his distinctive conception of
the inﬁnitely free will in yy21-7 of the Philosophy of Right, which culminates in his
cryptic notion of ‘the free will which wills the free will.’21 This group of sections
takes up from Hegel’s criticism of empiricist (including Kantian) moral
psychologies as representing an indeterminate ‘‘formal universality’’ in contrast
with the concrete content of the various drives, and thus this group of passages is
in a structurally parallel position to the Spiritual Animal Kingdom of the
Phenomenology. Here I want to suggest that we can use ‘interest’ and ‘talent’ to
interpret Hegel’s master presentation of the distinction between the subjective
and objective sides of the free will within this group of passages. In y25, he
presents the aspects of the subjectivity of the will as follows:
(1) formal self-certainty;
(2) the particularity of free choice (Willku¨r) and contingent content; and
(3) the one-sided form of self-consciousness as an unaccomplished end.
Let us think a bit further about what these three aspects of subjectivity mean as
different kinds or senses of interest, and speciﬁcally individual interest:
(1) Formal self-certainty. The term Hegel uses here for ‘certainty’ is Gewißheit:
‘die reine Gewißheit seiner selbst, unterschieden von der Wahrheit [the pure certainty of
itself, differentiated from the truth]’ (PRy25). This is, of course, a familiar
distinction from Hegel’s Phenomenology, where each stage of consciousness
presents distinctive conceptions of certainty and truth, and the question is
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whether they ﬁt together as advertised. But both in the Phenomenology and here in
the Philosophy of Right, a better (though admittedly less standard) translation of
‘Gewißheit’ might be ‘awareness,’ so long as one understands such an awareness to
make a claim to veridicality.22 This is related to the notion of an interest in two
ways. First, because of the way in which framing some object in terms of the
form of subjectivity constitutes an appropriation on Hegel’s view, i.e., which turns
a fact or purpose into a content of a particular subject: ‘Thus something is called
subjective that belongs to consciousness as what is my own [als dem Meinigen
angeho¨rt]yAll drives for knowledge and culture consist in this sense, that what is
also become my own, posited in my subjectivity’ (VPR III, 157). The fact that
this can be put in both the theoretical and the practical register indicates the
breadth of the point Hegel is trying to make here: to take an interest in something
is to see oneself in it, which is in a certain sense to see oneself conﬁrmed in it.23
The second sense in which self-awareness is a kind of interest is concerned
more directly with the reﬂexivity of self-awareness: ‘I am a subject, I am I, so
[subjectivity] is my pure interiority, that I reﬂect myself into myself, the self-
consciousness that I am I myself ’ (VPR IV, 144). Given the magniﬁcation of the
self-reﬂection of the I described here, it is not surprising that Fichte makes this
connection to interest, though originally in a negative mode. Fichte holds that for
truly ethical, disinterested action, the agent must forget himself, even trying to avoid
having any actual perception of himself as an individual (since this would be
awareness of his inadequacy as a tool of reason).24 The ﬂip side of this coin is
that any self-awareness is an interest, i.e., an investment in one’s self. On Hegel’s
more positive employment of this basic recognition—motivated by the idea that
all successful agency involves an element of (perceptible) self-conﬁrmation—this
awareness is an inherent part of free, individual subjectivity. An interest thus
expresses who I take myself to be, which is in principle distinguishable from who
I really am. Particularly in an expressivist moral psychology such as Hegel’s, such
self-awareness is a commitment to who I want to be, i.e., what implicit nature
I want to express. So I have not merely a theoretical interest in conﬁrming my
self-impression, but that impression itself has a normative element that makes it
an interest as well. Because my self-impression is awareness of a free and active
being motivated in part by such awareness, it is inherently an action-guiding
and -motivating norm. Thus it is not surprising that Hegel associates this ‘pure
self-awareness’ with the Kantian distinction between a free subject and a mere
thing (VPR IV, 144). One of the respects in which I take myself is qua free, and
when I am coerced or forced merely to obey authority this commitment is
challenged by the truth of reality.25
(2) Willku¨r and contingent content. This is the easiest of the three senses of
subjectivity to see in the notion of an interest. The notion of a free choice
between options and a diversity of goals and objects characterizes the plurality of
Christopher L. Yeomans
49
interests that ramiﬁes into everything from professions to hobbies to ‘lifestyles.’
The diversity of psychic investment in objects, where that investment is grounded
only in the decision to take an interest and in the presence of the object is a
central feature of our modern understanding of the will. Thus Hegel takes the
opportunity to emphasize that an exclusive valorization of subjectivity in this
sense in the root of vanity (VPR III, 157) and evil (VPR IV, 144).
(3) Unaccomplished end. Here we have the sense of ‘subjective will’ that is
perhaps closest to the current philosophical understanding of the term, i.e.,
something like a desire yet to be satisﬁed. The drive of the subjective will is to
realize itself, and though it is understood as contrasted with objectivity there is a
kind of internal connection between the two. This is represented in the idea
sometimes present in the analytic philosophy of action that there is a necessary
relation between an intention and a corresponding action such that, absent any
intervening conditions, the agent necessarily acts on that intention. In his lectures,
Hegel draws out the sense in which this is an interest by pointing to its reciprocal
relation to the ﬁrst aspect of the subjectivity of the will, i.e., self-certainty: ‘All
human doing is making the subjective into the objective and then again to
possess oneself of everything objective, so that it is my own. This inﬁnite avarice
is subjectivity’ (VPR III, 159). To take an interest in something is not to be a passive
yet consistent observer, but rather to desire one outcome rather than another.
If someone says that they have a great interest in politics, but do not care who gets
elected or what laws are passed, then it would be doubtful whether they have
accurately described their attitude. An interest is aimed at objectivity and is to that
extent both deﬁcient in virtue of and yet enriched by that internal connection.
Hegel describes the objectivity of the will in three ways, each of which is
clearly meant to be parallel to the aspects of subjectivity (PRy26):
(1) the will, der ‘sich selbst zu seiner Bestimmung hat’;
(2) ‘‘the will immersed into its object or condition, whatever the content
of the latter may be,’’ without the inﬁnite form of self-consciousness;
and
(3) external existence as ‘die Ausfu¨hrung seiner Zweck.’26
In parallel with the above discussion of interest and subjectivity, let us brieﬂy
consider how the notion of talent might regiment Hegel’s thought on these three
points:27
(1) The will that has itself for its own determination. It is in engaging in activities
for which I have a talent that I have my own character or vocation (as Bestimmung
might also be translated here) as the content of my will. For Hegel, talents
are individualized forms of the capacity to set ends (i.e., of ‘humanity’ in Kant’s
sense of the term). In his discussion here, Hegel claims that the will which ‘has
itself as its determinationyis thus in conformity with its concept and truly itself
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[seinem Begriffe gema¨ß und wahrhaftig ist].’ As discussed above, this reference to
objectivity as truth is one half of the reference to subjectivity as certainty or
awareness. The goal of self-knowledge is to connect awareness with truth.
(2) The will immersed in its conditions. Talent has a way of exercising itself
without conscious awareness. So, for example, my daughter often dances without
knowing it (e.g., while doing dishes, listening to her mother) and as a child
Magic Johnson was always dribbling a basketball wherever he went. The odd
collection of adjectives Hegel uses for the will that is objective in this way is
telling: ‘the childish, ethical, slavish, superstitious and so on.’28 What they all have
in common is doing things because they are done, rather than as consciously
justiﬁed by any particular reasoning process. At an individual level, this basic
pattern of actuality is speciﬁed by our habitual exercises of talents of all sorts, and
we modify, e.g., our speaking accent or the way we mount a bicycle with great
difﬁculty. Part of the reason we can change them only with difﬁculty is because
the effectiveness of our talents organizes our perception of the environment in
which we act. It is, in fact, somewhat difﬁcult even to bring these objective
features of our own self to conscious awareness so as to make them subject to
our interest in the way that, for example, a dialogue coach might help an actress
to become aware of the difference between her own natural accent and the target
accent of her character.
(3) The end realized in external existence. Hegel speciﬁcally associates the
development of talent with this aspect of objectivity in his contrasting remarks on
the parallel aspect of subjectivity. In describing the unaccomplished end, Hegel
writes, ‘The child is still undeveloped according to reason, thus subjective in its
own self; in its self-consciousness this concept is not yet realized. In unwrought
people [Den rohen Menschen], their will has not yet come to objectiﬁcation in
themselves’, (VPR IV, 144-5). Talents are not just the means for the fulﬁllment of
ends, but their development is also itself the fulﬁllment of an end. A talent for
music allows for effective practicing which then develops the talent itself.
In starting to think of the relation between subjectivity and objectivity on
this model, the beginning of PRy26Z is helpful: ‘It is usually believed that the
subjective and objective are ﬁrmly opposed to one another. But this is not the
case; they in fact pass over into one another, for they are not abstract
determinations like positive and negative, but already have a more concrete
signiﬁcance.’ This concrete signiﬁcance can be understood in terms of the
interactions of talents and interests. That is, talents and interests can give us a
concrete, phenomenological grip on Hegel’s distinctive but abstract logical claim
that the subjective and objective ‘pass over into each other.’
(1) Self-certainty & the truth of the will’s own vocation. When my talents are
sufﬁcient for me to accomplish a goal in which I am interested, my formal sense
of self is conﬁrmed substantively as my own vocation, i.e., as accurately
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representing who I am. In this way, this formal self-awareness comes together
with truth to generate true self-knowledge—this is ‘phenomenology’ in the
distinctively Hegelian sense, as noted above. Hegel emphasizes this in his account
of how individuals come to know themselves as persons: ‘The human being, in
his immediate existence in himself, is a natural entity, external to his concept; it is
only through the training (Ausbildung) of his own body and spirit, essentially by
means of his self-consciousness comprehending itself as free, that he takes possession of
himself and becomes his own property as distinct from that of others’ (PRy57).
That is, our practical self-knowledge is not a simple matter of the perception of
an object (though it certainly has a perceptual component); rather, we learn what
our talents are by learning to use them. Part of concrete self-knowledge (of which
the will is essentially a form, on Hegel’s view) is recognizing not only where one’s
skills lie, but also the particular form of one’s skills in that area. Some people have
musical talent and others do not, but within the ﬁrst group are those whose skills
(e.g., pre-hearing) that are more effectively used in improvisation as opposed to
those whose skills (e.g., memorization of extensive passages) are more effectively
used in interpretation of a given score. Such self-knowledge is real knowledge,
i.e., it is knowledge of an object or of the objectivity of the self.
(2) Willku¨r and immersion in conditions. Seeing talent as self-exercising (even
without explicit consciousness) also helps to see how even the contingent, particular
content of the subjective will is in some sense grounded in the nature of the
individual (i.e., is an internal moving principle in the Aristotelian sense). Talent
illuminates the environment, so that a kitchen counter becomes a barre for my
daughter, and an empty water bottle becomes an instrument for Danilo Perez.29
Thus when Hegel gets to PRy27 in which freedom is made objective both as
a rational system of thought and as immediate actuality, the individual form of
this is the way that the mutual development of talents and interests shows that
the subjective and the objective are internally related, and that the concrete
pattern of interest is reﬂected in the speciﬁc skills of the subject.
(3) The realization of ends. Talents and interests can give the connection
between the distinctively inner form of subjectivity and external existence as the
sphere of the accomplishment of subjective purposes a doubly concrete sense.
First, in PRy57, Hegel claims that ‘this taking possession of oneself consists also
in translating into actuality what one is in terms of one’s concept (as possibility,
capacity (Vermo¨gen), or predisposition).’ Talents are most obviously the means for
this translation, but they are also in many cases the realized end.
Second, in a handwritten note to y57, Hegel emphasizes that talents are not
the same as subjectivity, but are internally related to subjectivity in such a way as
to allow their externalization (PR: 125). The concrete ego has capacities and
drives that constitute it without being identical to it or entirely under its control—
that control is a practical project, the project of taking possession of oneself.
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But when these natural drives, dispositions, and capacities are controlled, they are
skills (i.e., ‘talents’ in my reconstructive terminology) that constitute the objective
side of the agent and can be even further externalized (e.g., in the products of
labor or in athletic performances). Of course, put abstractly, self-constitution
looks like impossible bootstrapping; but put in terms of talents and interests, it
looks rather mundane.
This allows us to come to Hegel’s conception of ‘the free will which wills the free
will’ (PRy27). In his lectures, Hegel elaborates on this in the following way: ‘It is
therefore the absolute drive of the free spirit to achieve this its truth, to make of
itself its freedom objective [sich seine Freiheit objective zu machen], in the sense that for
it its authentic [wahrhafter] will is its object [Gegenstand] through which the free will
itself becomes objective [gegensta¨ndlich], and gives it the vocation, to present itself
in a world as something existent’ (VPR III, 163). It is important here to see the
radical nature of Hegel’s claim: the free will itself becomes an object, i.e.,
Gegenstand or something that has a stability and resistance of its own as against the
subjective of which it is the externalized form.30 As far as I can see, the term
‘talent’ answers best to a concept of ordinary human experience that describes a





1 Abbreviations: VGP: Vorlesungen u¨ber die Geschichte der Philosophie III, Vol. 20 in Hegel (1971).
PS/PG: Pha¨nomenologie des Geistes (ﬁrst reference is by paragraph number to Hegel (2008); the
second is to Vol. 3 in Hegel (1971). VPR: Vorlesungen u¨ber Rechtsphilosophie (Hegel 1974). PR:
Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, Vol. 7 in Hegel (1971). EL: Enzyklopa¨die I: Die Wissenschaft
der Logik, Vol. 8 in Hegel (1971).
2 Unless otherwise noted, all citations and references in this ﬁrst section are to this paragraph.
Here I use ‘talent’ [Talent] where Hegel discusses ‘‘special capacity, talent, character, etc.
[besondere Fa¨higkeit, Talent, Charakter usf.]’’ Talent covers the relevant kind of ability in all three
terms, and has the additional beneﬁt of better expressing the internal connections between the
relevant kinds of abilities, on the one hand, and interests and social projects, on the other.
Throughout his corpus, Hegel is remarkably casual in his terminology for this aspect of agency,
frequently having lists of rough synonyms as in the passage above, e.g., PS z385/PG 286: ‘gifts,
abilities, powers [Gaben, Fa¨higkeiten, Kra¨fte]’; and PRy277Z: ‘Capacity, ability, character belong
to the particularity of the individualy[Fa¨higkeit, Geschicklichkeit, Charakter].’ At PRy291 he uses
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Befa¨higung (skill, aptitude) in a roughly similar sense. On the universal character of talent, see
PS z398/PG 294-5.
3 The points here are connected to Allen Wood’s concise explanation of the way in which
Hegel’s self-actualization theory is different from both deontological and teleological theories:
‘‘In such a theory, it is misleading to consider ‘self-actualization’ as the end or goal of the
selfyFrom one point of view, self-actualization is simply a by-product of acting in certain ways,
following certain principles and successfully pursuing other ends. But it has the appearance of
an end because for a self-actualization theory, these ends have their value and these principles
their force because they are the ends and principles of a certain sort of self ’’ (Wood 1990: 31-2).
4 I have made this case at length and with Hegelian texts in Yeomans (2011).
5 The notion of explanation as responding to a gap in our understanding is drawn from
Wright (2011).
6 Terry Pinkard has a very nice summary of the historical context of this idea in Pinkard
(1996): 112-5.
7 In the Doctrine of Virtue (Kant 1996: 6:382).
8 Pippin emphasizes this aspect of Hegel’s theory of agency in the Reason chapter of the
Phenomenology, though not as framed speciﬁcally in terms of talents and interests (2009: 151-3).
In general, this feature has been framed in terms of retrospectivity, though in fact the
temporality involved is broader. For a good discussion of this issue and an alternate proposal,
see Deligiorgi (2010).
9 Fichte’s System of Ethics is a text which begins with the problem of individual self-appropriation:
‘‘to think oneself, merely as oneself, i.e., separated from everything that is not ourselves’’ (Fichte
1965: Vol. 4, 18 and Fichte 2005: 24). As part of the solution to that problem, Fichte refers the
reader to the Foundations of Natural Right, a text which begins with the claim that the ﬁnite rational
being cannot posit itself as such ‘‘without ascribing a free efﬁcacy to itself ’’ (Fichte 1965: Vol. 3,
17 and Fichte 2000: 18). Property right is justiﬁed because of the role it plays in solving the
problem of individual efﬁcacy: to ﬁnd ourselves as free requires ‘‘that the object in experience
that is thought of through the concept of the person’s efﬁcacy actually correspond to that
concept; what is required, therefore, is that something in the world outside the rational individual
follow from the thought of his activity’’ (Fichte 1965: Vol. 3, 9 and Fichte 2000: 9), and since to
posit oneself as an individual is to posit oneself as one among many, it turns out that only on the
assumption of a sphere under my exclusive control can my efﬁcacy be made cognizable for me.
10 Thus, contra Moyar (2011: 89n18), the invocation of talents opens agency up to the
inﬂuence of external conditions precisely by being a way of characterizing them as one’s own.
As far as I can see, Hegel raises the chicken-and-egg problem of ﬁnding a beginning only to
dismiss it quickly precisely by reference to the relation of talents and interests.
11 Of course, one might modify the basic Humean picture to include such an internal relation,
thus producing ‘besires’ instead of distinct beliefs and desires. But one might think that there is
always a tension between the basic Humean materials (belief and desire) and understanding
them as internally related. For an example of such a tension, consider the dialectic and framing
in Zangwill (2008).
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12 This feature of Hegel’s view suggests a certain problem from the Kantian point of view,
which is that my interest in morality is pegged to my talent for morality, which might be rather
low. On the one hand, Hegel mitigates this problem by not thinking of moral reasons or
interests as a distinctive (universal) subset of reasons as opposed to (particular) non-moral
reasons. For Hegel, morality is an awareness of one’s individual responsibility in all action
precisely in holding together the universal and particular aspects, so it is not a talent that one
can be without in any fundamental sense (cf. Moyar’s interesting conception of ‘‘the burden of
non-detachment’’ (2011: y3.5)). On the other hand, Hegel recognizes that certain kinds of
talent and activity do not naturally suggest moral interests in the more speciﬁc sense of care or
concern for others. Speciﬁcally, Hegel describes the Gesinnung or disposition of the merchant
class that arises in part from their talent for pure exchange through money as: ‘‘this pitilessness
[Ha¨rte] of spirit, in which the particular as completely divested no longer counts,—strict right,
exchange must be honored, regardless of what must perish: family, prosperity, life, etc.—
complete mercilessness’’ (Hegel 1976: 269-70).
13 Thus the connection between talents and interests helps to explain a use of ‘interest’ noted
by Moyar, namely one that he takes ‘‘to be synonymous with standing purpose and
commitment, but also to include the way that the natural motives are structured through one’s attachment
to purposes’’ (2011: 64, emphasis mine).
14 See Yeomans (2010).
15 Of course, this assumes that the element that deﬁnes the core of agency is also the element that
secures personal identity in the sense of making each person/agent the distinct individual that they
are. One might deny this—and Velleman appears to in more recent work—but then one loses the
connection between agency and personal identity that appears to make us the authors of our own
lives in the sense traditionally bound up with concepts of free agency. Thus Velleman’s model is
structurally unable to serve as a model of self-determination. See particularly the ‘Introduction’ to
Velleman (2006). Nonetheless, it is important not to overgeneralize this point. It is certainly not
the case that my interests or talents must be absolutely unique to me—it is not even true
that they could be. Widely shared groupings of talents and interests actually facilitate self-
individuation. But there is a necessary mean to the scope of that sharing, and Velleman’s
Kantian view represents the other extreme, and thus a feature that could individuate human
agents as opposed, say, to other animals, but not some particular agent as opposed to another.
16 For Hegel, the problem is much more acute, since he claims to have shown that knowledge
of the world is parasitic on knowledge of the self. Thus, if we cannot know ourselves as
individuals we cannot know anything at all. Given the generally naturalistic contemporary
background to Velleman’s concern, the stakes are not as high: even if I cannot know myself,
the validity of science and our perceptual awareness of the world do not hang in the balance.
17 This is due to a general feature of the Phenomenology, which is that consciousness in general is
taken to be self-reﬂective in the sense of always containing some sort of account of itself, i.e.,
of how it is trying to know an object.
18 Thus tracing the connection between the spiritual animal kingdom and the duty of virtue to
develop talents helps to prevent an overemphasis—common in the secondary literature—on
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the negative thrust of the former. Robert Pippin (1993: 75-7) presents this balance concisely,
where the commitment to recognized self-realization develops the implicit sociality of talents and
interests behind the back of their professed individualistic prudence. Ru¨diger Bittner presents
only the negative side in framing the section as an argument for the claim that prudence
(i.e., practical reason based solely on individual life plans) does not exist. (1989: 149). In my view,
talent and interest become distorted ideals in the Spiritual Animal Kingdom because the Sache
selbst or heart of the matter remains an empty placeholder and is not yet developed into the
speciﬁc common social projects in which talents and interests are developed and exercised.
In this way the Sache selbst is analogous to the Good in the Philosophy of Right in the sense that for
both, their evacuated but proleptic character helps to frame the emptiness objection against Kant
as an objection against a view that has retreated from a fuller conception of moral value that is
available to it. Only with the speciﬁc social relations (in the Spirit chapter of the Phenomenology, and
in Ethical Life in the Philosophy of Right) do we have speciﬁc principles of judgment to adjudicate
the kinds of disputes that arise in the spiritual animal kingdom and thus to curb the prevalence of
deception and hypocrisy in personal relations.
19 Often interpreters identify the spiritual animal kingdom with civil society (e.g., Bloch 1951
and Lukacs 1975). But the breadth of the duty to develop one’s talents belies this more narrow
identiﬁcation. This is particularly true if one takes civil society to be identiﬁed with the system
of needs that sees to the satisfaction of particular and given needs separate from the
universality of right (e.g., Blasche (2004: 185)). Certainly talents and interests have a natural
element, but the whole point of Hegel’s conception of their relation is to show how the givenness
of nature is transformed into the expression of free agency (which is the very content of right, on
Hegel’s view), and furthermore in a rather speciﬁcally self-conscious way. Also, the scope of talents
is not restricted to civil society among the institutions of ethical life, a fact demonstrated by the
importance of Vermo¨gen to the family (see, e.g., Ciavatta (2009: Ch. 6)).
20 For this reason, it has a similar function to conscience as Moyar understands it (2011: 30).
Thus it is not surprising that there are deep structural similarities in the Phenomenology between
Hegel’s presentation and criticism of the Spiritual Animal Kingdom, on the one hand, and
conscience, on the other. In both cases, the positive developments of structures of agency are
easily missed amid the charges of hypocrisy. One can see the interrelation of talents and
interests as a moral psychology of the way in which agents hold together the speciﬁc purpose
that describes their particular action, their standing purposes as individuals, and the universal
purposes of their institutional context (Moyar 2011: 76).
21 Cf. the good summary treatment of these passages that ties them back to Hegel’s schematic
presentation of the will in PRyy5-7 in Rose (2007: 52-54).
22 This was originally suggested to me by Pierre Keller.
23 See also Hegel’s characterization of Kantian pure apperception as ‘‘the activity of making
one’s own [die Ta¨tigkeit des Vermeinigens]’’ (ELy42Z1).
24 Fichte (1965: Vol. 4, 257 and 347).
25 Cf. Quante (2004: 36-8) for a somewhat different understanding of the relation between the
theoretical and practical aspects of the will. Brieﬂy, I take the use of the certainty/truth
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distinction in the ﬁrst sense of subjectivity to indicate that the form of consciousness is deeply
involved in that sense of subjectivity (which Quante re-orders as ‘‘Subjective3’’, rather than
being limited to the third sense of subjectivity (Quante’s ‘‘Subjective2’’). A consideration of the
relation between PRyy8 & 9 further supports my interpretation, since there the owning of the
content (the ﬁrst sense of subjectivity) is said to be the end in accordance with the form of
consciousness.
26 This is an aspect of Hegel’s thought that appears to develop quite late in the lectures that
lead up to the published text of the Philosophy of Right, since all three of the three objective sides
do not yet appear even in the Berlin lectures of 1818/1819.
27 Despite the apparently contrary remark at the beginning of y25, Hegel is at pains
(particularly in the Zusatz of y26) to say that the difference between subjectivity and objectivity
is not the distinction between the particular and the universal or general.
28 Hegel’s lecture remarks at VPR III, 161 are particularly helpful here.
29 This is a point grounded in Hegel’s theory of absolute modality. See Yeomans (2011, Ch. 7).
30 For interesting treatments of this issue see Schmidt am Busch (2010 and 2002).
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